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Abstract This paper constructs an index to study two questions within a growing
school of macroeconomic thought, Market Monetarism. This school argues that the
central bank has full control over all nominal variables in the economy and is solely
responsible for aggregate demand management. To manage aggregate demand, Market
Monetarism argues the central bank should target Nominal GDP. We address two issues
of contention. First, we measure the optimal size of the optimal NGDP target. Second,
we measure the extent to which central banks should engage in level targeting, i.e.,
whether central banks should correct for past errors when hitting their targets. We find
evidence consistent with a five percent target but are unable to find consistent evidence
regarding level targeting.
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JEL Classification E3 . E5
1 Introduction
As the Great Recession persisted at the turn of the decade, most economists agreed the
cause of unemployment was a shortfall in aggregate demand. Central banks continued
cutting rates until they backed up against the zero lower bound associated with interest
rate targeting. In accordance with introductory textbooks, economists called for fiscal
stimulus. However, a small group of economists, later to be known as BMarket
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Monetarists,^ claimed this advice went against modern mainstream macroeconomic
research: monetary stimulus remains highly effective even at the zero lower bound.
Market Monetarists argue that the adequate and sufficient level of aggregate demand
can always be achieved by targeting the path of Nominal Gross Domestic Product.
NGDP targeting was discussed within academia during the 1980s although it was never
formally adopted (see, e.g., Meade 1978; Bean 1983; Frankel 1995).1 Its revival has
mostly appeared on the blogosphere, although discussions have also appeared in
academic journals (e.g. Sumner 2014; Beckworth 2011; Hendrickson 2012; Murphy
2013), and in reality perhaps the proposal had never truly lost prominence amongst
macroeconomists (Kim and Henderson 2005; Guender 2007; McCallum 2015; Sumner
2015). More importantly, perhaps, the argument for NGDP targeting has had a signif-
icant impact on discussions within and around central banks (for example, see Aldrick
and Carney 2012; Romer 2011).
The intention of this paper is to make a serious scholarly inquiry into two internal
issues of contention within Market Monetarism. The first is straightforward: what rate
of NGDP growth are we meant to target? The median belief appears to favor a target
around 5 % per year. Others radically argue for a 0 % target, and arguing for a target
greater than 5 % is certainly imaginable. The second question is concerned with to what
extent central banks should level target. If NGDP falls off its expected path, should the
central bank Bcatch up^ in future periods? With the significant deviation from NGDP
trend growth following the commencement of the Great Recession, a level target may
require further significant price level inflation to return NGDP to where it Bshould^ be.
Moreover, should level targeting have a long memory? That is, should central banks
consider the path of NGDP from several years ago in determining the desired path of
NGDP growth today?
Our strategy is to allow the data to tell us which policies correspond to the best
outcomes. We construct an index of historical NGDP growth rates, evaluating them
against inflation and unemployment rates. Our index contains a parameter correspond-
ing to the magnitude of the NGDP target and a parameter corresponding to what extent
level targeting should be employed. Country-level data dictates the values of the
parameters. In some ways, this is similar to developing a prescriptive policy rule, as
in Taylor (1993). In contrast, however, the path of NGDP is used explicitly to minimize
future inflation and unemployment rates, instead of using past inflation and output gap
data to dictate the path of interest rates.
One point that should be emphasized is that this paper makes no claim to provide
evidence in favor of NGDP targeting or Market Monetarism over alternative monetary
policies or macroeconomic schools of thought. Yet, although it takes certain tenets of
Market Monetarism for granted, it still promises to derive certain conclusions relevant
to central bankers and macroeconomists in general.
2 Preliminaries
The way an NGDP target is best thought of is to decompose it into components. First,
should NGDP increase due to secular per capita growth? Second, should NGDP
1 See Frankel (2012) for a literature review.
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increase due to population growth? Third, should NGDP increase so as to allow for
persistent price level inflation on average, and if so, by how much? A five percent
NGDP target may correspond to a projected 1.5 % increase in RGDP per capita, a
1.5 % increase in population, and 2 % inflation. Under this scenario, when RGDP
growth falls below its secular trend (e.g., via a supply shock), more inflation is
introduced automatically into the system so nominal wages do not need to fall off
trend. Conversely, when the economy is operating above what is believed to be its
secular trend, inflation is reduced, possibly even resulting in deflation, to return the
economy to its long run equilibrium in labor markets.
The above scenario corresponds to the type of NGDP target Sumner (2012) has
endorsed. An alternative earlier proposal is Hayek’s (1931) argument for a 0 % target
(see Cachanosky 2014).2 According to this point of view, deviations from the 0 % target
(in either direction) subvert the price system in a non-neutral way, leading to unsus-
tainable growth or needless unemployment. A third perspective may be thought of as a
more extreme BKeynesian^ perspective arguing for higher inflation targets than devel-
oped countries typically adopt.3 To simplify, a stylization of this corresponds roughly to
a 10 % NGDP target. This distinction is summarized in Table 1.
The second concern is level targeting: whether the central bank should react to
previous failures to achieve its target. This was first discussed in Taylor (1985), see also
Hall and Mankiw 1994). The importance of the question in the context of the Great
Recession has been discussed by Sumner (2011) and it would have significant policy
implications. From 2010 to 2013, US NGDP has increased on average 3.8 % per year
according to Bureau of Economic Analysis statistics. This rate of growth is below the
median Market Monetarist position, but it is hardly disastrous (there are numerous
similar years throughout the Great Moderation). However, the United States never
returned to its trend NGDP and is falling further behind each year. The question then
becomes when the US economy can put the collapse of NGDP in 2008–09 permanently
behind it and shift to the long run vertical aggregate supply curve.
There are clear theoretical bases for each position on the optimal value of the target.
But level targeting is more theoretically ambiguous. The question requires the consid-
eration of the nature, meaning, and relative importance of price stickiness and debt
contracts, as well as the short run/long run distinction. It is hoped that this paper’s
method will shed empirical light on the NGDP level target as well.
3 Method and data
Our method is to create a simple index of a country’s central bank’s recent record at
achieving an NGDP target. This contrasts to other literature on NGDP targeting, which
often focuses on the effectiveness of NGDP targeting relative to other policies (as in
Guender 2007; Hendrickson 2012; Garin et al. 2015) or how it can be put into practice
(as in Sumner 2015). However, methodologically, by fitting a simple model to data to
investigate a prescriptive policy rule it is similar to Taylor (1993).
2 See Selgin (1997) for a similar, though not identical target. See White (1999) for a summary of Hayek’s
perspectives on monetary policy.
3 For arguments to this effect, see Ball (2014) and Krugman (2014).
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We then measure its correlation with Okun’s Misery Index, the sum of inflation and
unemployment rates. The rationale for this is, given the assumptions of Market
Monetarism, the Misery Index should be highest when the central bank fails to
adequately target the path of NGDP. This should eventually be observed in the outcome
variables, i.e., inflation and unemployment. While we begin with the traditional equal
weighting of inflation and unemployment, we will relax this assumption in our
robustness checks by doubling the weight first on inflation and then on unemployment
to test whether our results are sensitive to the implicit priorities of the Misery Index.
Our method is to numerically estimate two parameters which maximize the R2
between the index of the central bank’s record at targeting NGDP with the Misery
Index, subject to the constraint that the correlation coefficient R is positive. The second
constraint ensures that high R2 does indeed correspond to the relationship we are
interested in rather than its opposite. These two parameters correspond to our two
questions of interest. The first is how high the NGDP target should be set. The second
is the extent of level targeting. Each parameter can give an answer which confirms one
theory while rejecting the other, or the value it takes may end up being somewhere in
between.
Let NGDPt denote NGDP in quarter t and NGDP
*
t denote the value of Nominal
Gross Domestic Product which the parameters dictate it should be if the central bank is
operating optimally. Additionally, to give a sense of the central bank’s performance in
the recent past (as opposed to a single quarter), we look at the root sum of squared
deviations from NGDP*t over J quarters. Looking at several quarters also allows for
expectations to adjust to a new expected path of NGDP and to account for any long and
variable lags, or concerns regarding reverse causality. The root sum of squared devi-
ations is itself the index. In our estimations, J is set at eight quarters. Let φt denote the











NGDP*t originates as the weighted average of several different level targets. It first
looks back one year and calculates where NGDP would be if had hit the target. For
instance, if the target (denoted as K) is a five percent growth rate and NGDP was 100.0
a year ago, NGDP should be 105.0 today. But the model then looks back another
quarter (five quarters ago). If NGDP was at that point 99.0, then NGDP should be
99.0*(1.05^(5/4)) = 105.23. To determine NGDP*t , it re-estimates the level target for S
quarters and weights each in accordance with the parameter α. The weighting variable
α can be thought of as somewhat analogous to a discount rate. When α is Blarge,^ it
Table 1 Competing Hypothesis of the Optimal NGDP Target
BHayek^ BSumner^ BKeynesian^
0 % 5 % 10 %
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places all the weight on the most recent period. When α is Bsmall^ (bounded by −1), it
places weight on the most distant period. In this manner α captures the extent of level
targeting. Any value of α greater than −1 has a believable intuition. A value of −0.99
corresponds to placing all weight on the earliest period, a value of 0 equally weights all
periods, and an arbitrarily Blarge^ number places all weight on the most recent period.
Parameters K and α are our two parameters of interest. The formula for NGDP*t is




1þ αð Þi * 1þ
K
100





With all this in hand, we reach our maximization problem (which we will solve




s:t:α > −1;R > 0
ð3Þ
Calculating NGDP*t , necessitates a significant amount of data. Under the baseline




t requires five years
(sixteen quarters of NGDP level targets starting four quarters ago and then working
backwards). On the one hand, this rules out many countries for data reasons. On the
other, using this starting point to some extent insulates the results from the objection
that estimated optimal NGDP targets are contingent on inflationary expectations that
are malleable in the long run. In fact, in our robustness checks, we allow the procedure
to look back even further in the past.
The values the numerical maximization of this equation thereby inform our beliefs
about the optimal size of the target and the importance of level targeting. As stated, the
length of time considered using this method offers a means of allowing expectations to
adjust in the long run; this at least in part addresses (though not fully) concerns about
this method and the Lucas Critique. For instance, if the misery index would be
minimized in the long run with zero growth in nominal output, this method would
allow a significant lag for that to occur. However, if this period of time does not allow
for expectations to adjust, there are other useful interpretations of the empirical exercise
we are performing. One interpretation is that this methodology still allows for a test of
to what degree any deviation from trend NGDP growth may lead to increases in the
Misery Index. The presence of any relationship (or non-relationship) in the data may
require explanations as well. While we abstract from the deep parameters that are








essential to having a complete theoretical understand or conducting a conclusive test,
we still develop unique results that cannot be fully discounted.
Returning to the data, as a rule of thumb, any country that did not have at least one
inflationary episode in sample or at least thirty-five years of data was ruled out. We do
not believe this method will function reliably unless both one episode of an apparent
demand shortfall and one episode of excessive inflation appears in-sample, for the
general reason that more variance among observations reduces error. We identified the
three pieces of quarterly data we required, inflation, unemployment, and NGDP, for
seventeen countries. The only truly notable omission is Germany, due to the enormous
ambiguities resulting from East and West Germany’s reunification in the middle of the
sample. We were left with a reasonable mix of countries. Importantly, a few of the
countries, namely Mexico, Ireland, Taiwan, Spain, and Portugal, were not at the world
technological frontier during at least some periods of our sample. This is of interest
theoretically; if a country is able to sustainably grow its RGDP at 7 % for a number of
years, the optimal NGDP target must be at least that high to avoid deflation.
Several different data sources were used to piece together quarterly data for the three
variables of interest. These sources are summarized in Table 2 along with the years
where all three variables have overlapping coverage. These sources are FRED, pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the IMF’s International Finance Statistics, labor and unemployment statistics
from the OECD, the Labor Market Statistics published by the UK’s Office for National
Statistics, and National Statistics of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The sample of
countries is exhaustive of what data are available from these sources, subject to the
condition mentioned above that the sample must apparently include at least one episode
of a demand shortfall and one inflationary episode. Finally, descriptive statistics of
Table 2 Data Sources
Country NGDP Inflation Unemployment Year Coverage
United States FRED BLS BLS 1953–2013
Canada IFS OECD OECD 1970–2013
United Kingdom IFS OECD LMS 1976–2013
Japan IFS OECD OECD 1975–2013
Spain IFS OCED FRED 1978–2012
France IFS OECD FRED 1978–2012
Ireland FRED OECD FRED 1982–2012
Austria IFS OECD FRED 1976–2013
Portugal IFS OECD OECD 1983–2013
Finland IFS OECD OECD 1976–2012
Sweden IFS OECD FRED 1986–2012
Norway IFS OECD FRED 1976–2012
Australia IFS OECD OECD 1976–2013
Netherlands IFS OECD FRED 1983–2012
Switzerland IFS OECD FRED 1981–2011
Taiwan NS-ROC NS-ROC NS-ROC 1987–2014
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year-to-year NGDP growth rates, inflation, and unemployment by country are provided
in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
4 Results
Broadly speaking, most results conform to a 5 % NGDP Target, as shown in
Table 6.5 Those in the sample range from an NGDP target in the Netherlands
of 2.70 to 20.94 in Austria. All except Austria fall within the interval two to
eight. The differences between the countries do not follow any obvious pattern,
and any extrapolation from such a small sample is hazardous. The two ex-
tremes of the Netherlands and Austria have very low R2; it is likely it is an
indication that the model is weak and perhaps meaningless in those cases. In
such cases, factors other than aggregate demand management dominate the
variation in the Misery Index over time to such a degree that no relationship
is readily apparent. Conversely, it may limn the limits of the Market Monetarist
model, though there are several examples of sensible results with high R2 to be found in
Table 6. It is worth noting that three of the five countries most distant from the
technological frontier – also the three of the five with the highest R2 – Spain,
Portugal, and Taiwan, have the three highest NGDP targets among all seventeen
countries.
The absence of countries with a calculated optimal NGDP target close to zero offers
evidence against the BHayekian^ policy rule. That Japan has such a low target
following two decades of virtually zero price level inflation is perhaps demon-
strative of eventual adjustments to inflationary expectations, but it may instead
reflect its rapidly aging population or the luck of a draw in a small sample. The
result for the Netherlands has such a low R2 that it is inappropriate to see it as
indicative of anything. Overall, for advanced economies, a starting point of a
five percent NGDP target is clearly supported by the data. The results also do
not reject increasing the NGDP target further in countries with higher secular
growth rates, which coheres with the earlier explanation that the target may be
viewed as the targeted sum of RDGP and some level of inflation. The results
do not either reject the Keynesian argument for still higher rates of inflation,
but they are less supported than the Market Monetarist (Sumner) position, as
described in Table 1.
The results of the α parameter were actually genuinely surprising. We expected that
α would not generally take values less than zero, as we believed the optimal weighting
would always weight the most recent period the most highly. Instead, these
results support a strong version of level targeting. For countries with a negative
value, greater weight should be placed on the earlier periods. In fact, for the
many countries with an α calculated to be −0.99, this is in practice a corner
solution placing all weight on the earliest period. This implies these countries
would best minimize their Misery Index over time by ignoring recent changes
5 Included in Table 6 and subsequent tables are results regarding the slope coefficients. These are included to
allow for a complete picture of the modeling results, but comparisons across countries are not readily apparent,
as the variation amongst them is driven largely by the variation in the K and α parameters.
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and actively target based on the path dictated from five years ago (as in the
model, one year back followed by sixteen quarters back).
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics – NGDP Year-Over-Year Growth Rates (%) by Country
Country Mean s.d. min max
United States 6.66 3.56 −3.68 19.55
Canada 7.71 4.54 −7.30 20.94
United Kingdom 8.48 5.59 −5.12 29.18
Japan 4.63 5.91 −8.81 23.18
Spain 10.40 6.92 −4.57 27.64
France 6.97 5.08 −2.94 19.46
Ireland 10.73 7.89 −10.93 29.66
Austria 5.91 3.78 −5.07 20.09
Portugal 11.33 9.42 −4.07 33.00
Finland 8.00 6.88 −8.77 31.77
Sweden 5.97 3.78 −4.05 15.42
Norway 8.99 6.33 −10.10 30.78
Australia 9.07 4.60 −1.23 23.75
Netherland 4.37 2.69 −4.27 13.84
Switzerland 3.98 3.54 −3.62 20.11
Taiwan 6.83 5.06 −8.59 20.04
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics – Inflation Rates by Country
Country Mean s.d. min max
United States 3.69 2.89 −2.10 14.70
Canada 4.29 3.32 −0.90 12.70
United Kingdom 5.93 5.53 0.60 26.60
Japan 2.82 4.60 −2.20 23.40
Spain 6.30 5.00 −1.10 23.50
France 3.91 3.80 −0.40 14.10
Ireland 3.70 3.71 −6.10 21.00
Austria 3.48 2.20 0.00 10.00
Portugal 6.81 7.01 −1.50 30.60
Finland 5.18 4.63 −1.00 18.50
Sweden 5.15 4.00 −1.40 14.70
Norway 4.96 3.59 −1.40 14.60
Australia 5.65 4.08 −0.40 17.70
Netherland 3.52 2.67 −1.20 10.90
Switzerland 2.19 1.99 −1.00 8.50
Taiwan 1.71 1.71 −1.34 5.96
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics – Unemployment Rates by Country
Country Mean s.d. min max
United States 5.90 1.63 2.60 10.40
Canada 8.09 1.76 4.90 12.90
United Kingdom 7.19 2.36 3.40 11.90
Japan 3.11 1.25 1.10 5.40
Spain 14.54 4.44 5.40 23.80
France 8.83 1.50 4.50 11.30
Ireland 10.87 4.80 3.70 17.00
Austria 5.04 2.07 1.46 7.92
Portugal 7.88 3.18 3.90 17.50
Finland 7.50 3.71 2.10 17.60
Sweden 4.80 2.80 1.40 10.30
Norway 3.38 1.49 1.20 6.70
Australia 6.33 2.25 1.60 11.10
Netherland 4.90 1.73 0.90 8.40
Switzerland 2.15 1.51 0.10 4.60
Taiwan 3.15 1.32 1.30 6.08
Table 6 Baseline Results
Country K α R2 Slope
United States 5.64 −0.08 0.65 53.52
Canada 3.77 −0.99 0.62 27.10
United Kingdom 5.04 −0.99 0.79 26.36
Japan 2.81 −0.12 0.55 16.08
Spain 7.45 −0.99 0.52 20.71
France 4.84 −0.14 0.75 22.82
Ireland 4.54 −0.99 0.11 15.76
Austria 20.94 −0.99 0.10 1.78
Portugal 7.77 * 0.79 123.86
Finland 6.90 −0.07 0.41 27.82
Sweden 5.58 * 0.16 46.90
Norway 6.99 −0.99 0.44 15.46
Australia 6.93 −0.02 0.73 45.12
Netherlands 2.70 −0.99 0.01 3.68
Switzerland 4.19 0.52 0.20 36.32
Mexico 4.67 −0.99 0.27 12.54
Taiwan 7.92 −0.32 0.17 15.41
*Denotes very large number that should be interpreted as a corner solution in α. In K, the model has failed to
find a maximum at a Breasonable^ value
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Portugal and Sweden, however, are the exceptions. Their alphas are calculated to be
very Blarge^ (2982.7 and 27.8), both of which in practice mean to only consider the
most recent period. In our results tables, we have starred out (*) any Blarge^ estimation
to avoid confusion over its interpretation.6 These results reject the usefulness of level
targeting for these countries.
There is some additional economic interpretation to the value of the R2 between the
Misery Index and our index. We should expect high R2 in countries whose Misery
Indexes are dominated more by demand side factors and who have had steady secular
growth rates. The countries with R2 less than 0.20 are Ireland, Sweden, Austria, the
Netherlands, and Taiwan. Taiwan and Ireland may have had rapidly changing secular
growth rates and it is not a controversial claim that supply side reforms and shocks in
Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands may have had greater impacts on their economies
than failures in their aggregate demand management.
Countries with high R2 can be thought of as those who would have had the most to
gain with better aggregate demand management, conceived of through the NGDP
targeting lens. The countries with an R2 of at least 0.70 are the United Kingdom,
Portugal, France, and Australia. Little obvious connects these countries. However, the
data suggest that these countries would have historically accrued the most benefits in
engaging in this policy and where a constant parameterization is most appropriate.
Another way of looking at the results is to graph the index over time. This has been
done for the United States in Fig. 1, an example of a country where the index performs
well. Fig. 2 applies the index to Portugal and Fig. 3 applies it to Taiwan. While visually
these figures may appear to offer strong evidence in favor of Market Monetarism, we
do not argue as such and do not believe that, for instance, this metric applied to the
United States would perform out of sample as well as the R2 suggests. While the R2
calculated may accurately reflect the relative importance of aggregate demand
management as measured by NGDP across countries, R2 literally is the variable
maximized in-sample. The purpose of this empirical exercise is to see which
hypothesis most closely matches the data. These three figures may be of interest
nonetheless and it may be possible to use a method similar to this to evaluate
aggregate demand management out of sample.





























































Fig. 1. Index applied to the United States
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5 Robustness checks
The robustness checks performed lead us to be somewhat circumspect about our
results. Not all of the initial results appear robust. That is an interesting empirical
finding, perhaps a challenge, to the Market Monetarist model. That is, if the optimal
NGDP target or the optimal extent of level targeting is sensitive to how the index is
constructed, it raises questions as to how straightforward it is to develop a policy
function for each country’s central bank.
The first robustness check is to have the index consider 12 or 20 quarters of data
instead of 16. These results are found in Tables 7 and 8. When this is performed, the
optimal NGDP targets actually change very little, which is reassuring. After omitting
countries with an R2 less than 0.20, the average of all NGDP targets rises from
5.77 using 16 quarters to 5.91 using 12 quarters and to 5.92 using twenty
quarters. Among the countries for which the model had an R2 of at least 0.20,
the greatest change is Canada’s K rising from 3.77 in the baseline to 5.30 with
12 quarters and 5.41 with twenty quarters. It should also be noted that the model ceases
to performwell in certain countries depending on the window used, for instance Sweden
when a window of 12 quarters is used, and that the K values for the Netherlands are no
longer at the fringe of reasonable in the robustness checks (and have therefore been
starred out). Still, for most countries, the K parameter is well behaved regardless of the
window used.
However, the α parameter (level targeting) is a bit more suspect. The United States,
Japan, and Finland shift from a corner solution to deeply into the interior depending on
the time frame used. This, in conjunction with the general unpredictability of the α
parameter across countries, raises doubts regarding whether we can really be confident
about level targeting one way or the other. Contrary to the strong positions taken
regarding the relative importance of level targeting, the data simply do not support
strong beliefs, and its sensitivity to rather small changes in time frame are disturbing.
The second robustness check adjusts the weights on the Misery Index.7 Instead of an
equal weighting, it first doubles the weight on inflation. Secondly, it instead doubles the












Fig. 2. Index applied to Portugal
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weight on unemployment. These results can be found in Tables 9 and 10. They conform
to theory, as the average calculated K falls to 4.66 when inflation is double weighted
and rises to 7.70 when unemployment is double weighted. This supports in some sense
the existence of a permanent inflation-unemployment tradeoff. Additionally, the aver-
age R2 is 0.53 with inflation double weighted, in comparison to 0.43 in the baseline
specification and 0.41 with unemployment double weighted, supporting the belief that









Fig. 3. Index applied to Taiwan
Table 7 Results Using 12 Quarter Window
Country K α R2 Slope
United States 5.94 −0.99 0.68 67.21
Canada 5.30 −0.99 0.61 26.07
United Kingdom 4.79 −0.99 0.74 30.23
Japan 2.80 −0.31 0.66 16.55
Spain 7.59 −0.99 0.49 23.15
France 4.81 −0.62 0.76 21.77
Ireland 3.43 −0.99 0.09 16.30
Austria 10.58 −0.90 0.06 2.65
Portugal 7.72 * 0.80 31.91
Finland 6.68 −0.99 0.50 22.78
Sweden 15.70 −0.99 0.00 0.33
Norway 7.02 −0.99 0.38 18.07
Australia 6.82 −0.35 0.74 36.48
Netherlands 1.91 −0.99 0.01 3.98
Switzerland 4.20 −0.99 0.22 7.66
Mexico 5.86 −0.99 0.21 12.17
Taiwan 8.04 −0.94 0.18 7.20
*Denotes very large number that should be interpreted as a corner solution in α. In K, the model has failed to
find a maximum at a Breasonable^ value
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employment levels. In α, Austria, Norway, and the Netherlands swing from corner
solutions to strongly interior solutions, although in general α behaves better under this
series of robustness checks than in the first series.
6 Conclusion
This paper finds some evidence in favor of an NGDP target of around 5 %. However,
the relationship is not especially tight and deviations from the optimal target do not
always explain very much of the variation of unemployment and inflation within every
country. The model undeniably fails as applied to a subset of the countries investigated,
namely Austria, Sweden, and especially the Netherlands. Additionally, as operational-
ized in this paper, it is wholly unclear whether level targeting is appropriate. Countries
vary drastically in this regard and may change drastically and unpredictably, depending
on the construction of the index. It is not out of the question that an alternative
operationalization of level targeting – the one used in this index is one way among
many, done in part for the preference of minimizing the number of parameters – but the
erratic behavior found here is still disconcerting. Such operationalizations and formal-
izations may shed more light on some of the difficulties found here. Procedures
similar to that found in this paper may be extended to other monetary rules in
future research as well.
Table 8 Results Using 20 Quarter Window
Country K α R2 Slope
United States 5.90 −0.04 0.79 68.06
Canada 5.41 −0.99 0.61 19.13
United Kingdom 5.24 −0.99 0.81 23.16
Japan 2.96 −0.99 0.42 7.84
Spain 7.42 −0.99 0.55 18.53
France 4.85 0.01 0.74 25.31
Ireland 9.92 −0.99 0.16 15.64
Austria 36.73 −0.99 0.12 0.74
Portugal 7.82 * 0.82 103.17
Finland 7.14 0.02 0.34 12.91
Sweden 5.07 * 0.20 49.80
Norway 6.70 −0.99 0.48 13.38
Australia 7.05 0.09 0.71 22.86
Netherlands * 8.19 0.01 0.001
Switzerland 4.09 0.59 0.18 52.62
Mexico 5.02 −0.99 0.25 12.61
Taiwan 7.54 −0.11 0.17 5.19
*Denotes very large number that should be interpreted as a corner solution in α. In K, the model has failed to
find a maximum at a Breasonable^ value
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Table 9 Results Using Double
Weight on Inflation
Country K α R2 Slope
United States 4.56 0.05 0.64 106.36
Canada 3.50 −0.99 0.72 52.78
United Kingdom 4.99 −0.99 0.83 49.14
Japan 1.30 −0.06 0.62 33.05
Spain 6.76 −0.99 0.81 44.38
France 4.59 −0.09 0.83 55.81
Ireland 3.72 −0.99 0.29 36.73
Austria 3.87 −0.74 0.16 10.19
Portugal 5.86 * 0.78 204.88
Finland 4.65 0.08 0.70 73.27
Sweden 3.61 1.00 0.40 133.31
Norway 6.34 −0.99 0.59 34.81
Australia 6.62 0.02 0.78 88.23
Netherlands −19.26 −0.99 0.01 29.31
Switzerland 3.06 0.15 0.40 59.70
Mexico 5.64 −0.99 0.30 25.82
Taiwan 6.11 −0.99 0.13 17.21
*Denotes very large number that should be interpreted as a corner
solution in α. In K, the model has failed to find a maximum at a
Breasonable^ value
Table 10 Results Using Double
Weight on Unemployment
Country K α R2 Slope
United Stated 5.99 −0.11 0.65 74.70
Canada 4.12 −0.99 0.39 28.55
United Kingdom 5.07 −0.99 0.62 29.95
Japan 4.53 −0.05 0.59 18.27
Spain 7.63 −0.99 0.14 17.39
France 5.71 −0.16 0.35 16.18
Ireland 11.10 −0.99 0.11 22.11
Austria 13.87 −0.99 0.59 11.84
Portugal 10.36 * 0.82 204.90
Finland 9.27 −0.16 0.39 36.33
Sweden 9.88 0.44 0.41 73.65
Norway 8.57 −0.41 0.15 14.38
Australia 7.29 0.01 0.54 57.41
Netherlands * 15.17 0.06 0.01
Switzerland 5.80 0.44 0.26 47.74
Mexico 7.15 −0.99 0.20 10.62
Taiwan 11.01 0.02 0.63 15.41
*Denotes very large number that should be interpreted as a corner
solution in α. In K, the model has failed to find a maximum at a
Breasonable^ value
J Econ Finan
Even if this method is unconvincing in its ability to fully address the long run effects
of adjusting expectations, the level of fit in many countries is suggestive of the
importance (or the relative importance, across countries) of a given NGDP target in
explaining inflation and unemployment over time. Why R2 differs so greatly across
countries or why results for level targeting are not robust are themselves interesting
questions without obvious answers. We hope they are answered in the future.
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